Abstract: The market-oriented promotion of recycled construction and demolition(C& D)waste products involves strategic interactions and co-evolution among multiple stakeholders. Based on multi-agent evolutionary game theory, this study systematically analyzes the payoff structures and behavioral incentives of four core stakeholders-government, production enterprises, user enterprises, and the public, and constructs a dynamic four-party evolutionary game model. Under differentiated government regulation scenarios, the study explores the evolutionary paths and behavioral stability of stakeholders in terms of supply-side incentives, demand-side market responses, and public perception of recycled products. Numerical simulations reveal that public acceptance of recycled products significantly influences strategic decisions of production and user enterprises. When the government regulation intensity threshold is p≥0.35 and the minimum procurement ratio of user enterprises is m≥0.1, the system can overcome the "low-level lock-in" and converge toward an effective equilibrium, thereby promoting efficient utilization of recycled products. The findings suggest that dynamic and precise subsidies should be based on the cost differential between traditional and recycled materials, and regulatory costs can be structurally transferred into incremental subsidies for recycling enterprises.

Key words: construction and demolition waste, recycled products, four-party evolution game, evolutionary path