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Incentive mechanisms for ecological product value realization under multilevel governance: a three-stage game analysis of the Yellow River Basin
- FANG Lan, WANG Yangyang
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2026, 61(10):
8-28.
doi:10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2026.099
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Realizing the value of ecological products is an important pathway for promoting ecological protection and high-quality development in the Yellow River Basin. Under multi-level governance structures and conditions of information asymmetry, how to design effective incentive mechanisms to enhance genuine ecological investment and improve the efficiency of ecological compensation has become an urgent issue. Based on the realities of ecological governance in the Yellow River Basin, this paper constructs a three-stage game model involving the central government, local governments, and ecological suppliers. It considers three scenarios: the socially optimal benchmark under complete information, conventional performance-based compensation under information asymmetry, and the introduction of an audit accountability mechanism. The paper systematically examines the effects of ecological compensation, local supervision, and audit constraints on ecological product supply and the efficiency of value realization. The results show that:(1)Increasing the intensity of ecological compensation can encourage ecological suppliers to increase genuine ecological investment and expand certified performance as well as the scale of ecological product supply. However, under information asymmetry, it may also simultaneously strengthen incentives for certification bias, resulting in the coexistence of expanded supply scale and insufficient supply authenticity.(2)Local government supervision serves as a key transmission mechanism linking fiscal incentives with genuine ecological improvement. Strengthened supervision can not only reduce certification bias and improve performance identification, but also increase the returns to genuine ecological investment, thereby enhancing the efficiency of ecological product supply.(3)Compared with conventional performance-based compensation, the audit accountability mechanism, when costs are controllable, can strengthen local supervision, increase genuine ecological investment, reduce certification bias, and narrow performance deviations, thereby moving institutional outcomes closer to the socially optimal allocation and alleviating compensation mismatch under information asymmetry.(4)As the basic returns of ecological products increase, social welfare rises overall, while the optimal performance-based ecological transfer payment gradually declines and approaches zero. This indicates that the enhanced revenue-generating capacity of ecological products helps reduce institutional dependence on fiscal compensation, although institutional optimization remains indispensable. The findings of this paper contribute to a deeper theoretical understanding of the value realization mechanism of ecological products and provide policy implications for optimizing the ecological compensation system in the Yellow River Basin and improving a coordinated governance framework that integrates ecological compensation, local supervision, and audit accountability.