JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE) ›› 2026, Vol. 61 ›› Issue (8): 99-115.doi: 10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2024.333

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Decision making of new energy vehicle supply chain considering altruistic preference under government subsidies

RONG Luqing, LIAO Zhongqi, PANG Chuanlong   

  1. Guangxi University of Science and Technology, Liuzhou 545006, Guangxi, China
  • Published:2026-08-12

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Abstract: This paper studies the impacts of government subsidies, altruistic preferences, and cost-sharing contracts on the new energy vehicle(NEV)supply chain. By employing Stackelberg game theory, we construct five decision-making models to analyze how subsidies and altruistic preferences influence supply chain decisions. The findings reveal that:(1)The profitability of the NEV supply chain is jointly shaped by government subsidy mechanisms and suppliers R& D investments, and their synergy can lead to Pareto improvements in stakeholders profits.(2)Consumers preference for green driving range capability serves as a key market driver, promoting simultaneous growth in price and profit while encouraging supply chain participants to enhance environmental performance.(3)Battery suppliers altruistic behavior exhibits a threshold effect on supply chain equilibrium, generally exerting a positive influence on green outcomes and coordination performance, moderated by R& D costs.(4)Cost-sharing contracts have multi-dimensional effects on technological upgrades, price dynamics, and profit distribution, with an optimal cost-sharing ratio existing to maximize overall utility. The results provide a theoretical paradigm and practical pathway for precision formulation of government industrial subsidy policies and dynamic optimization of corporate R&D cooperation strategies in the NEV sector.

Key words: new energy vehicle, altruistic preference, government subsidies, cost-sharing, green range capability

CLC Number: 

  • F224
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