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J4 ›› 2012, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (12): 14-21.

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需求依赖库存量的n-2型供应链网络决策模型研究

徐兵,熊勇   

  1. 南昌大学管理科学与工程系, 江西 南昌 330031
  • 收稿日期:2012-01-17 出版日期:2012-12-20 发布日期:2012-12-14
  • 作者简介:徐兵(1972- ),男,教授,博士,硕士生导师,研究方向为运筹学、物流与供应链管理. Email: xu_bing99@sina.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70961006);中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目(20100481186,2012T50593)

Research on the decision models of supply chain network with n-2 structure and inventorydependent demand

XU Bing, XIONG Yong   

  1. Department of Management Science and Engineering, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, Jiangxi, China
  • Received:2012-01-17 Online:2012-12-20 Published:2012-12-14

摘要:

针对n个制造商和2个零售商组成的供应链网络,假定不同制造商生产的品牌产品无差异、产品需求依赖于产品初始库存水平,并受到竞争产品库存和竞争零售商产品库存的影响,分别研究了各成员以自身利润最大化为目标进行分散式决策的带均衡约束的均衡模型、制造商主导的以品牌利润最大化为目标进行集中式决策的纳什均衡模型、以及零售商主导的以渠道利润最大化为目标进行集中式决策的纳什均衡模型,并给出了三种模式下的竞争均衡状态。结果表明,三种模式中分散式决策模式下的订购量最低,导致相应的品牌利润低于品牌利润最大化决策模式、相应的渠道利润低于渠道利润最大化模式。提出了可协调分散式供应链中零售商分别选择品牌利润最大化模式下的订购量和渠道利润最大化模式下的订购量的两种回购合同形式。数值算例表明了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性。

关键词: 供应链网络;需求依赖于库存量;带均衡约束的均衡问题;纳什均衡

Abstract:

Considering a supply chain network consisting of n manufacturers and 2 retailers, under the assumption that the products produced by different manufacturers are homogeneous and the demand of each kind of product is dependent on its inventory and influenced by the inventories of other products at the same retailer and another retailer, three decision models of supply chain network were studied respectively such as the equilibrium problem with equilibrium constrains when each agent tries to make decentralized decisions to maximize his own profit. Nash equilibrium model when each manufacturer is dominant and tries to make centralized decisions to maximize the profit of his brand, Nash equilibrium model when each retailer is dominant and tries to make centralized decisions to maximize the profit of his channel. The equilibrium states of three cases were put forward. It shows that the order quantities under decentralized model is lowest, so that the profits of each brand under decentralized model is lower than those under brand-profit-maximization model, and the profits of each channel under decentralized model is lower than those under channel-profitmaximization model. Two buy-back contracts are put forward respectively to coordinate the retailers in decentralized supply chain to choose the same order quantities under brand-profit-maximization model and under channel-profitmaximization model. Final numerical example proves the reasonability of models and validity of coordinative contracts. 

Key words:  supply chain network; inventory-dependent demand; Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constrains (EPEC); Nash equilibrium

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