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山东大学学报（理学版） ›› 2017, Vol. 52 ›› Issue (6): 1-9.doi: 10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2017.045

• •    下一篇

基于Hotelling模型的两厂商选址定价完全序贯决策

徐兵1,2,张阳1   

  1. 1. 南昌大学管理学院, 江西 南昌 330031;2. 南昌大学中国中部经济社会发展研究中心, 江西 南昌 330031
  • 收稿日期:2017-02-17 出版日期:2017-06-20 发布日期:2017-06-21
  • 作者简介:徐兵(1972— ),男,博士,教授,博士生导师, 研究方向为物流与供应链管理、运筹学.E-mail: xu-bing99@sina.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71561018,71502076);江西省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地项目;2016年度江西省研究生创新项目(YC2016-B015)

Research on totally sequential decision-model of two firms location and pricing based on Hotelling model

XU Bing1,2, ZHANG Yang1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, Jiangxi, China;
    2. Center for Central China Economic Society Development Research, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, Jiangxi, China
  • Received:2017-02-17 Online:2017-06-20 Published:2017-06-21

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摘要： 针对现代市场中广泛存在厂商先后进入的情况,基于Hotelling模型构建了线性市场上二次运输成本下两厂商水平竞争的完全序贯决策模型,其中先进入市场的厂商先选址再定价,随后跟随者先选址再定价。两厂商的博弈分析表明:跟随者具有后发优势,将获得更大的利润;先进入者将定位在市场端点,并采取低价策略;跟随者将定位在市场中心,并采取高价策略。进一步对所建的完全序贯决策模型、两厂商先后同时选址与定价的博弈模型、两厂商先同时选址再同时定价的博弈模型、两厂商先同时选址再先后定价的博弈模型进行了对比分析,研究结果表明:完全序贯决策与两厂商先后同时选址与定价的决策一致,且定价和厂商利润均较低;4种博弈顺序下两厂商水平竞争均衡都难以实现社会福利最大,需要政府“有形的手”发挥作用。

关键词: 社会福利最大化, 博弈模型, 选址与定价竞争, 完全序贯决策

Abstract: It widely exists that firms enter the modern market sequentially. Based on Hotelling model, one decision-model of totally sequential entry with quadratic transportation cost was built to characterize the horizontal competition of two firms in a linear market that the leader makes price-decision after location-decision, and then the follower makes price-decision after location-decision. The analysis of two firms game shows that the follower has the advantage and gains more profits as a late-mover. The leader will locate at the end of market and chooses low-price strategy, while the follower will locate at the center of market and choose high-price strategy. The comparison of the decision-model of totally sequential entry, the game model of two firms making simultaneous decisions of location and price one after another, the game model that two firms simultaneously make location-decisions before they make price-decisions one after another, the game model that two firms make simultaneously price-decisions after their location-decisions were made simultaneously. It shows that the decisions of the first model and the second model are same, in which the prices and profits of two firms are lower than the following models. All four models cant realize the welfare-maximization of society. It needs “the visible hand” of government to regulate the behavior of firms.

Key words: game model, competition of location and pricing, welfare-maximization of society, totally sequential decision

中图分类号: 

  • F270
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