J4 ›› 2013, Vol. 48 ›› Issue (3): 42-47.
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许民利,郭沙沙
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基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171203);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(09YJC630230);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(10JJ3023)
XU Min-li, GUO Sha-sha
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摘要：
为了建立委托代理问题中的信任机制,利用序贯互惠均衡(sequential reciprocity equilibrium, SRE)和有限理性的思想分析了委托人和代理人之间两阶段信任博弈和重复信任博弈,结果发现只要互惠敏感度满足一定条件,委托人的最优策略是选择信任代理人,而代理人的最优策略是选择值得委托人信任,信任博弈对代理问题的治理具有有效性。
关键词: 序贯互惠均衡;委托代理;信任博弈
Abstract:
In order to establish the mechanism of trust in the principal-agent problem, the two phases trust and repeat trust game between the principal and agent were studied by using the sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) and limited rational thinking. The results show that as long as the certain conditions are met to mutual sensitivity, the optimal strategy of the principal is to trust the agent, and the agent′s optimal strategy is worth the principal trust. Trust game is effective in the principalagent problem.
Key words: sequential reciprocity equilibrium; the principal-agent relationship; trust game
许民利,郭沙沙. 基于序贯互惠均衡的委托代理信任研究[J]. J4, 2013, 48(3): 42-47.
XU Min-li, GUO Sha-sha. Trust between principal and agent based on the sequential reciprocal equilibrium[J]. J4, 2013, 48(3): 42-47.
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http://lxbwk.njournal.sdu.edu.cn/CN/Y2013/V48/I3/42
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