JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE) ›› 2019, Vol. 54 ›› Issue (11): 35-51.doi: 10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2018.598

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Decision-making and coordination of green supply chain with risk aversion under government subsidies

ZHANG Ke-yong1, LI Chun-xia1*, YAO Jian-ming2, LI Jiang-xin1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, North University of China, Taiyuan 030051, Shanxi, China;
    2. School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
  • Published:2019-11-06

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Abstract: In the green supply chain, both the government green subsidy and the member risk aversion characteristics are considered, the decentralized decision model and the centralized decision model are established. Through the analysis of the model, the risk aversion characteristics of the manufacturer will adversely affect the development of the green supply chain is found, but the implementation of the government subsidy policy could effectively reduce the negative effects. The more a retailers is afraid of risk, the more conductive to the improvement of product green degree. Both the government subsidy ratio and the member risk aversion will affect the member decision variable value and utility value and the intensity of the two influences is different. The incentives of government subsidy policies can weaken the negative effects of member risk aversion on their own utility, and promote the overall utility and social welfare of the supply chain to be higher than the risk-neutral situation of members. By comparing the coordination process of the three kinds of contracts for the green supply chain system, it is concluded that the revenue sharing-cost sharing contract is better than the single traditional contract coordination and verified by numerical simulation.

Key words: government subsidies, risk aversion, green supply chains, social welfare, revenue sharing-cost sharing contract

CLC Number: 

  • F272
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