JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE) ›› 2022, Vol. 57 ›› Issue (3): 89-95.doi: 10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2021.616

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Research on information disclosure decision of bilateral platform in the blockchain era

GUI Yun-miao1, HU Hong-chun2*, GONG Ben-gang1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, Anhui, China;
    2. Staff Development Institute of China National Tobacco Corporation, Zhengzhou 450008, Henan, China
  • Published:2022-03-15

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Abstract: Based on the influence of blockchain on unit information disclosure cost and platform users demand function, the game decision-making models of platform information disclosure under monopoly is established, competition bottleneck and duopoly market respectively, and further studies the influence of consumer information cognition on platform information disclosure decision-making. It is found that the optimal information disclosure level of platform will increase with the increase of the proportion of information sensitive consumers, and increase with the reduction of unit information disclosure cost in monopoly and competitive markets. The optimal information disclosure level of platform in competitive bottleneck and duopoly market is the same, and the optimal profit of platform will decrease with the increase of information disclosure competition. When consumers are more sensitive to information or consumers cognitive level of information is lower, platforms will gain more profits by adopting blockchain technology to improve the information disclosure level of products.

Key words: blockchain, two-sided platform, information disclosure, game model

CLC Number: 

  • F272.3
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