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《山东大学学报(理学版)》 ›› 2023, Vol. 58 ›› Issue (11): 104-115.doi: 10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2022.213

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不同权力结构下考虑制造商在线推介的双渠道供应链均衡

郭婷婷1(),吴正祥2,*()   

  1. 1. 辽宁工程技术大学工商管理学院, 辽宁 葫芦岛 125105
    2. 辽宁工程技术大学营销管理学院, 辽宁 葫芦岛 125105
  • 收稿日期:2022-04-05 出版日期:2023-11-20 发布日期:2023-11-07
  • 通讯作者: 吴正祥 E-mail:guotingting8909@yeah.net;wuzhengxiang89@126.com
  • 作者简介:郭婷婷(1989—)，女，讲师，硕士生导师，博士，研究方向为服务供应链管理、行为运作管理. E-mail: guotingting8909@yeah.net
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BGL108);辽宁省社科规划基金资助项目(L20BGL028);辽宁省教育厅科学研究经费资助项目(LJ2020JCW007)

Equilibrium of dual-channel supply chain considering manufacturer online referral under different power structures

Tingting GUO1(),Zhengxiang WU2,*()   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105, Liaoning, China
    2. School of Marketing Management, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105, Liaoning, China
  • Received:2022-04-05 Online:2023-11-20 Published:2023-11-07
  • Contact: Zhengxiang WU E-mail:guotingting8909@yeah.net;wuzhengxiang89@126.com

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摘要：

运用Stackelberg和Bertrand博弈理论构建了3种不同权力结构下存在制造商在线推介的双渠道供应链优化模型, 研究了不同情形下的双渠道供应链均衡。通过比较分析, 探讨了制造商与实体零售商能否就在线推介方式的选择达成一致的问题, 分析了在线推介方式对产品定价、渠道市场总需求以及制造商或实体零售商作为供应链主导者时的先动优势的影响。结果表明: 3种权力结构下, 制造商与实体零售商具有一致的在线推介方式选择偏好; 在线推介方式不会改变产品的网络零售价格, 但会改变产品的批发价格和实体零售价格; 制造商同时推介实体零售渠道和网络直销渠道会降低网络直销渠道市场总需求, 但会提高实体零售渠道市场总需求; 在线推介方式不会影响制造商或实体零售商作为供应链主导者时的先动优势。

关键词: 双渠道供应链, 在线推介, 权力结构

Abstract:

Based on Stackelberg and Bertrand game theory, the optimization models of dual-channel supply chain with manufacturer online referral under three power structures are established, and the dual-channel supply chain equilibrium in different situations is studied. Through comparative analysis of the dual-channel supply chain equilibrium, the issue of whether the manufacturer and the physical retailer can reach an agreement on the selection of online referral method is discussed. The effect of the online referral method on product pricing, total market demand of the channel, and the first-mover advantage of the manufacturer or the physical retailer act as the supply chain leader are analyzed. The results show that the manufacturer and the physical retailer have the same preference for online referral method. Online referral method will not change the online retail price of the product, but it will change the wholesale price and the physical retail price. In addition, when the manufacturer promotes both the online direct channel and the physical retail channel, the total market demand of the online direct channel will be reduced, the total market demand of the physical retail channel will be increased. The online referral method will not affect the first-mover advantage when manufacturer or physical retailer act as supply chain leader.

Key words: dual-channel supply chain, online referral, power structure

中图分类号: 

  • F274

表1

不同在线推介方式下各渠道的市场总需求"

在线推介方式 渠道类型
实体零售渠道 网络直销渠道
仅推介网络直销渠道 $\frac{(1-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}-p_{\mathrm{r}}+\delta p_{\mathrm{e}}}{1-\delta^{2}}$ $\frac{(1-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}-p_{\mathrm{e}}+\delta p_{\mathrm{r}}}{1-\delta^{2}}+\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}-p_{\mathrm{e}}\right)$
同时推介实体零售渠道和网络直销渠道 $\frac{(1-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}-p_{\mathrm{r}}+\delta p_{\mathrm{e}}}{1-\delta^{2}}+\frac{(1-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}-p_{\mathrm{r}}+\delta p_{\mathrm{e}}}{1-\delta^{2}}$ $\frac{(1-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}-p_{\mathrm{e}}+\delta p_{\mathrm{r}}}{1-\delta^2}+\frac{(1-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}-p_{\mathrm{e}}+\delta p_{\mathrm{r}}}{1-\delta^2}$

表2

制造商主导时的双渠道供应链均衡结果"

均衡结果 在线推介方式
仅推介网络直销渠道(i=d) 同时推介实体零售渠道和网络直销渠道(i=s)
$w^{\mathrm{M} i *}$ $\frac{\delta \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+(2-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4} $$\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_t}{4}$
$p_{\mathrm{e}}^{\mathrm{M} i *}$ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4} $$\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4}$
$p_{\mathrm{r}}^{\mathrm{M} i *}$ $\frac{\delta \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+(3-2 \delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4} $ $\frac{(3-\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)}{8} $
$D_{\mathrm{e}}^{\mathrm{M} i *}$ $\frac{2(1+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+(2+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4(1+\delta)} $ $\frac{(2+\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)}{4(1+\delta)}$
$D_{\mathrm{r}}^{\mathrm{M} i *}$ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4(1+\delta)} $ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4(1+\delta)} $
$\pi_{\mathrm{m}}^{\mathrm{M} i *}$ $\frac{(1+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}^2+2(1+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}} \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}+2 \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}^2}{8(1+\delta)} $ $\frac{(3+\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)^2}{16(1+\delta)}$
$\pi_{\mathrm{r}}^{\mathrm{M} i *}$ $\frac{(1-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}^2}{16(1+\delta)}$ $\frac{(1-\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)^2}{32(1+\delta)}$

表3

实体零售商主导时的双渠道供应链均衡结果"

均衡结果 在线推介方式
仅推介网络直销渠道(i=d) 同时推介实体零售渠道和网络直销渠道(i=s)
$w^{\mathrm{R} i *}$ $\frac{\delta \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4} $ $\frac{(1+\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)}{8} $
$p_{\mathrm{e}}^{\mathrm{R} i *}$ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4}$ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4} $
$p_{\mathrm{r}}^{\mathrm{R} i *}$ $\frac{\delta \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+(3-2 \delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4} $ $\frac{(3-\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)}{8}$
$D_{\mathrm{e}}^{\mathrm{R} i *}$ $\frac{2(1+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+(2+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4(1+\delta)} $ $\frac{(2+\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)}{4(1+\delta)} $
$D_{\mathrm{r}}^{\mathrm{R} i *}$ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4(1+\delta)} $ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4(1+\delta)} $
$\pi_{\mathrm{m}}^{\mathrm{R} i *}$ $\frac{2(1+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}^2+4(1+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}} \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}+(3+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}^2}{16(1+\delta)} $ $\frac{(5+3 \delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)^2}{32(1+\delta)} $
$\pi_{\mathrm{r}}^{\mathrm{R} i *}$ $\frac{(1-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}^2}{8(1+\delta)}$ $\frac{(1-\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)^2}{16(1+\delta)}$

表4

制造商与实体零售商权力平衡时的双渠道供应链均衡结果"

均衡结果 在线推介方式
仅推介网络直销渠道(i=d) 同时推介实体零售渠道和网络直销渠道(i=s)
$w^{\mathrm{N} i *}$ $\frac{3 \delta \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+(4-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{12}$ $\frac{(2+\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)}{12}$
$p_{\mathrm{e}}^{\mathrm{N} i *}$ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{4}$ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_t}{4} $
$p_{\mathrm{r}}^{\mathrm{N} i *}$ $\frac{3 \delta \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+(8-5 \delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{12}$ $\frac{(4-\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)}{12} $
$D_{\mathrm{e}}^{\mathrm{N} i *}$ $\frac{3(1+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+(3+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{6(1+\delta)}$ $\frac{(3+\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)}{6(1+\delta)} $
$D_{\mathrm{r}}^{\mathrm{N}i*}$ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{3(1+\delta)}$ $\frac{\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}}{3(1+\delta)} $
$\pi_{\mathrm{m}}^{\mathrm{N} i *}$ $\frac{9(1+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}}^2+18(1+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{r}} \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}+(17+\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}^2}{72(1+\delta)}$ $\frac{(13+5 \delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)^2}{72(1+\delta)}$
$\pi_{\mathrm{r}}^{\mathrm{N} i *}$ $\frac{(1-\delta) \alpha_{\mathrm{t}}^2}{9(1+\delta)}$ $\frac{(1-\delta)\left(\alpha_{\mathrm{r}}+\alpha_{\mathrm{t}}\right)^2}{18(1+\delta)}$

表5

不同权力结构下2种在线推介方式对应的均衡决策"

在线推介方式 变量 制造商主导(j=M) 实体零售商主导(j=R) 制造商与实体零售商权力平衡(j=N)
仅推介网络直销渠道 wjd* 53 43 46
pejd* 55 55 55
prjd* 63 63 60
Dejd* 101 101 98
Drjd* 16 16 21
πmjd* 6 363 6 206 6 328
πrjd* 156 313 278
同时推介实体零售渠道和网络直销渠道 wjs* 55 44 48
pejs* 55 55 55
prjs* 66 66 62
Dejs* 89 89 83
Drjs* 34 34 46
πmjs* 6 806 6 428 6 722
πrjs* 378 756 672
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