碳配额与交易监管下基于区块链技术的平台供应链网络运营决策

doi:10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2023.049

Abstract

Abstract:

Under the cap-and-trade regulation, based on Nash non-cooperative game theory and variational inequality theory, considering supplier's misrepresentation of carbon caps during the initial allocation and the demand of green information sensitive consumers for product verification, two platform supply chain network equilibrium models with and without blockchain technology are constructed. Then this paper explores and compares the equilibrium conditions of supply chain members and blockchain technology application thresholds before and after the application of blockchain technology. The modified contraction projection algorithm is used to solve the problem and some numerical examples are given to show that: the application of blockchain technology can avoid the inconsistency of carbon emission trading volume, further reduce the waste of resources and improve the profit of the supply chain. The supplier's misrepresentation of the carbon cap can to some extent improve the overall profit of the supply chain, but it inhibits the ability of the supply chain to achieve higher profits. Within a certain threshold of blockchain technology operating costs, supply chain members have the motivation to adopt blockchain technology.

Key words: blockchain technology, cap-and-trade regulation, misrepresentation of carbon cap, green information sensitivity, platform supply chain network equilibrium

CLC Number:

F272.3

Cong SHI,Guitao ZHANG,Xiao ZHANG,Shuaicheng LIN. Platform supply chain network operation decision based on blockchain technology under cap-and-trade regulation[J].JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE), 2024, 59(1): 100-114, 123.

Figures/Tables 8

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References 26

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符号	含义
s	第s个供应商，s=1, 2, …, S
j	第j个高排放型制造商，j=1, 2, …, J
i	第i个低排放型制造商，i=1, 2, …, I
e	电商平台
c	“全碳链”服务中心
k	需求市场，k=1, 2, …, K
C_s^X	政府免费给供应商发放的碳配额
C_y	政府免费给2类制造商发放的碳配额，y=j, i
α_z1	生产单位原材料或新产品的碳排放量，z=s, j, i
α_y2	回收再制造环节单位产品的碳排放量，y=j, i
ε	供应商与2类制造商交易时“全碳链”服务中心收取的单位碳交易佣金
ω	单位碳交易价格
η	原材料转化率，η∈(0, 1)
μ	最低回收率，μ∈(0, 1)
β	理论再制造率，β∈(0, 1)
ϕ	供应商碳谎报失败的概率，ϕ∈(0, 1)
r	减排技术投资系数
δ	电商平台收取的佣金率，δ∈(0, 1)
t	检测信息花费的时间
s_c	服务水平的影响因子
h^X	检测出正品的概率，h^X=(0, 1]
$\vartheta^{X}$	单位碳交易价格的溢价程度，$\vartheta^{X}$∈[1, 2]
c^B	单位区块链运营成本；参考Yang等^[24]和Niu等^[25]的研究，本文认为区块链技术为供应商和制造商提供每件产品的信息追踪认证，并收取单位服务费(也指每件产品额外的区块链运营成本)，在本文中，供应链各方需支付各自的区块链运营费用
F	政府对企业单位碳配额谎报的惩罚成本
θ	消费者中对绿色产品、绿色信息感知敏感的比例，θ∈(0, 1)
τ	消费者对平台服务水平的偏好，τ∈(0, 1)
γ	消费者的低碳偏好，γ∈(0, 1)
g	消费者对检测时间的敏感程度，g∈(0, 1)
a	一个布尔变量，a=1(应用区块链技术)，a=0(未应用区块链技术)

符号	含义
q_sy^X	供应商与2类制造商原材料的交易量，$y=j, i, \boldsymbol{Q}_{1}^{1 X}=(q_{s j}^{X})_{S J \times 1} \in R_{+}^{S J}, \boldsymbol{Q}_{1}^{2}=(q_{s i})_{S \times 1} \in R_{+}^{S I}$
$q_{y k}^{v X}$	2类制造商利用原材料生产的产品数量，$y=j, i, \boldsymbol{q}_{1}^{\mathrm{vX}}=(q_{j \mathrm{k}}^{\mathrm{vX}})_{J K \times 1} \in R_{+}^{J K}, \boldsymbol{q}_{2}^{\mathrm{vX}}=(q_{i k}^{\mathrm{vX}})_{I K \times 1} \in R_{+}^{I K}$
$q_{y k}^{X}$	2类制造商销售给需求市场k的总产品供给量，$y=j, i, \boldsymbol{Q}_{2}^{1 X}=(q_{j k}^{X})_{J K \times 1} \in R_{+}^{J K}, \boldsymbol{Q}_{2}^{2 X}=(q_{i k}^{X})_{I K \times 1} \in R_{+}^{I K}$
$q_{k y}^{X}$	2类制造商从需求市场k回收的产品数量，$y=j, i, \boldsymbol{Q}_{3}^{1 X}=(q_{k j}^{X})_{J \times 1} \in R_{+}^{J K}, \boldsymbol{Q}_{3}^{2 X}=(q_{k i}^{X})_{I K \times 1} \in R_{+}^{I K}$
$t_{z}^{X}$	供应商与2类制造商的碳交易量，$z=s, j, i, \boldsymbol{t}_{1}^{X}=(t_{s}^{X})_{S \times 1} \in R_{+}^{S}, \boldsymbol{t}_{2}^{X}=(t_{j})_{J \times 1} \in R_{+}^{J}, \boldsymbol{t}_{3}^{X}=(t_{i})_{I \times 1} \in R_{+}^{I}$
$e_{i}^{X}$	低排放型制造商的碳减排量，$\hat{\boldsymbol{E}}^{X}=(e_{i}^{X})_{I \times 1} \in R_{+}^{I}$
$s_{\mathrm{e}}^{X}$	平台提供的服务水平，$\boldsymbol{S}^{X}=(s_{\mathrm{e}}^{X})_{E \times 1} \in R_{+}^{E}$
$p_{k}^{v X}$	消费者支付给两类制造商的单位产品价格，$y=j, i, \boldsymbol{P}_{1}^{X}=(p_{k}^{j X})_{K \times 1} \in R_{+}^{K}, \boldsymbol{P}_{2}^{X}=(p_{k}^{i X})_{K \times 1} \in R_{+}^{K}$

符号	含义
$c_{s}^{y}=c_{s}^{y}(q_{s y}^{X})$	供应商承担的与2类制造商的交易成本，$y=j, i$
$\hat{c}_{s}^{y}=\hat{c}_{s}^{y}(q_{s y}^{X})$	2类制造商承担的与供应商的交易成本，$y=j, i$
$c_{y k}=c_{y k}(q_{y k}^{X})$	2类制造商承担的与需求市场的交易成本，$y=j, i$
$\hat{c}_{y k}=\hat{c}_{y k}(q_{y k}^{X})$	需求市场承担的与2类制造商的交易成本，$y=j, i$
$f_{s}=f_{s}(q_{s y}^{X})$	供应商生产原材料的生产成本，$y=j, i$
$f_{y}=f_{y}(q_{y k}^{\mathrm{v} X})$	2类制造商生产新产品的生产成本，$y=j, i$
$c_{k}=c_{k}(q_{k y}^{X})$	2类制造商处理回收产品的处理成本，$y=j, i$
$f_{y}=f_{y}(q_{k y}^{N}, \beta)$	2类制造商再制造过程中的再制造成本，$y=j, i$
$c_{\mathrm{e}}=c_{\mathrm{e}}(s_{\mathrm{e}}^{X}, s_{\mathrm{c}})$	电商平台的基础服务投资成本
$w_{\mathrm{e}}=w_{\mathrm{e}}(q_{j k}^{X}, q_{i k}^{X}, s_{\mathrm{e}}^{X})$	电商平台的流量收益
$c_{z}^{t}=c_{z}^{t}(t_{z}^{X})$	由“全碳链”服务中心承担的与供应商与2类制造商的碳交易成本，$z=s, j, i$
$d_{k}^{y}(q_{y k}^{X})$	需求市场对2类制造商生产产品的需求量，$y=j, i$
$\rho_{s y}^{X}$	供应商与2类制造商之间的单位原材料价格，$y=j, i$
$\rho_{y k}^{X}$	2类制造商生产的新产品的单位零售价格，$y=j, i$
$\rho_{k y}^{X}$	2类制造商回收废旧产品的单位价格，$y=j, i$

参数	C_s^X	q_sj^X*	q_si^X*	q_jk^X*	q_ik^X*	q_jk^vX*	q_ik^vX*	q_kj^X*	q_ki^X*	t_s^X*	t_j^X*	t_i^X*
B模型	5.000 0	1.541 0	3.304 2	1.998 4	4.28 5	1.386 9	2.973 8	0.679 5	1.456 9	3.721 3	1.364 4	5.085 7
	6.000 0	1.277 2	3.108 3	1.656 3	4.030 9	1.149 5	2.797 4	0.563 2	1.370 5	1.893 9	0.754 2	5.285 9
	6.100 0	1.277 4	3.108 4	1.656 5	4.031 1	1.149 6	2.797 6	0.563 2	1.370 6	1.794 4	0.754 6	5.285 7
	6.200 0	1.277 5	3.108 6	1.656 8	4.031 3	1.149 8	2.797 7	0.563 3	1.370 6	1.695 0	0.755 0	5.285 5
N模型	6.300 0	1.277 7	3.108 7	1.657 0	4.031 5	1.149 9	2.797 9	0.563 4	1.370 7	1.595 6	0.755 4	5.285 3
	6.400 0	1.277 9	3.108 9	1.657 2	4.031 7	1.150 1	2.798 0	0.563 4	1.370 8	1.496 2	0.755 8	5.285 1
	6.500 0	1.278 0	3.109 1	1.657 4	4.031 9	1.150 2	2.798 2	0.563 5	1.370 9	1.396 8	0.756 2	5.284 9
	6.600 0	1.278 2	3.109 2	1.657 6	4.032 1	1.150 4	2.798 3	0.563 6	1.370 9	1.297 4	0.756 5	5.284 7

参数	C_s^X	p_k^jX*	p_k^iX*	s_e^X*	e_i^X*	π_s^X*	π_j^X*	π_i^X*	π_c^X*	π_e^X*	π^X*
B模型	5.000 0	28.782 0	38.941 0	10.000 0	2.396 9	25.587 6	33.103 8	165.993 0	8.156 5	102.443 0	335.254 0
	6.000 0	28.895 0	37.778 0	10.000 0	2.341 4	37.224 8	28.948 4	107.379 0	14.062 9	80.300 8	267.915 0
	6.100 0	28.895 0	37.777 4	10.000 0	2.341 4	37.460 3	28.953 1	107.386 0	13.871 8	80.307 0	267.978 0
	6.200 0	28.895 0	37.777 2	10.000 0	2.341 4	37.695 8	28.957 7	107.394 0	13.680 4	80.313 1	268.041 0
N模型	6.300 0	28.894 0	37.777 1	10.000 0	2.341 4	37.931 2	28.962 3	107.402 0	13.488 5	80.319 2	268.103 0
	6.400 0	28.894 0	37.769 0	10.000 0	2.341 4	38.166 7	28.966 9	107.410 0	13.296 3	80.325 3	268.165 0
	6.500 0	28.894 0	37.776 0	10.000 0	2.341 5	38.402 0	28.972 0	107.420 0	13.104 0	80.331 0	268.230 0
	6.600 0	28.894 0	37.776 7	10.000 0	2.341 5	38.637 7	28.976 1	107.426 0	12.910 6	80.337 5	268.287 0

Platform supply chain network operation decision based on blockchain technology under cap-and-trade regulation

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