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Study on preannouncement strategies of new platforms with characteristics of two-sided market
- GUI Yun-miao, WU Zhong, HU Hong-chun
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JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE). 2017, 52(9):
83-91.
doi:10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2017.201
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In order to improve market performance of new platforms’ preannouncement, the paper explores the problem on preannouncement strategies based on two-sided market and constructs formal strategy(F)and informal strategy(I)of new platform. By constructing a duopoly model with symmetrical product preannouncement strategies F-F, I-I and asymmetric F-I, the article analyses impacts of consumers and develops single-homing, consumers and develops multi-homing and consumers multi-homing and developers single-homing to platform competition. The result shows that while both of platforms adopt strategy F, if consumers and developers single-homing or consumers multi-homing and developers single-homing, a promoting on service level or a receding on cross-group network externalities can be beneficial to profit of platforms, if consumers and developers multi-homing, an enhancing on service level or cross-group network externalities can be beneficial to profit of platforms, while both of platforms adopt strategy I, the platform owning a larger installed base of developers gains more profit. In addition, whatever the homing consumers choose and whatever the strategy developers choose, strategy I always appears as the dominant strategy to both of platforms.