不同契约下嵌入区块链的低碳技术共享微分博弈策略

doi:10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2025.134

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以供应商和制造商组成的两级供应链为研究对象,探讨区块链技术对供应链低碳技术共享策略的影响。引入时间因素,构建了实施区块链前后无激励契约、成本分担契约和收益共享契约六种情况的微分博弈模型。通过对比分析发现,在实施区块链前,成本分担契约下供应商和制造商的低碳技术共享努力程度要高于无激励契约时的水平,而收益共享契约的实行取决于制造商对供应商收益共享比例的大小。此外,在成本分担比例和收益共享比例确定的情况下,无论何种契约,实施区块链后制造商销售价格都高于实施前,并且成本分担契约下的销售价格与无激励契约下的一样,当区块链成本大于一定值时,收益共享契约下制造商销售价格高于其余两种契约,反之则低于;同时发现,区块链使用成本适当的情况下,成本分担契约在不影响制造商销售价格和低碳技术共享努力程度的情况下提高供应链低碳技术共享水平,但如果区块链使用成本过高,反而会降低供应链技术共享水平。

关键词: 区块链, 契约协调, 微分博弈, 低碳技术共享, 低碳供应链

Abstract: Taking a two-tier supply chain composed of a supplier and a manufacturer as the research object, this paper explores the impact of blockchain technology on low-carbon technology sharing strategies within the supply chain. By introducing the time factor, differential game models are constructed for six scenarios: scenarios without incentive contracts, with cost-sharing contracts, and with revenue-sharing contracts, both before and after blockchain implementation. A comparative analysis reveals that before blockchain implementation, the level of low-carbon technology sharing effort by both the supplier and the manufacturer under a cost-sharing contract is higher than that under no incentive contract, while the implementation of a revenue-sharing contract depends on the proportion of revenue shared by the manufacturer with the supplier. Furthermore, given determined cost-sharing and revenue-sharing ratios, the manufacturers selling price after blockchain implementation is higher than before under any contract type. The selling price under a cost-sharing contract is the same as that under no incentive contract. When the blockchain cost exceeds a certain threshold, the selling price under a revenue-sharing contract is higher than under the other two contracts; otherwise, it is lower. The study also finds that with appropriate blockchain usage costs, a cost-sharing contract can enhance the level of low-carbon technology sharing in the supply chain without affecting the manufacturer's selling price or the level of sharing effort. However, if the blockchain usage cost is too high, it may instead reduce the supply chain's technology sharing level.

Key words: blockchain, contract coordination, differential game, low-carbon technology sharing, low-carbon supply chain

中图分类号:

F272

姜跃,陈锦聪. 不同契约下嵌入区块链的低碳技术共享微分博弈策略[J]. 《山东大学学报(理学版)》, 2026, 61(8): 64-76.

JIANG Yue, CHEN Jincong. Differential game strategy of low-carbon technology sharing embedded in blockchain under different contracts[J]. JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE), 2026, 61(8): 64-76.

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