多层级治理下生态产品价值实现的激励机制研究——基于黄河流域的三阶段博弈分析

doi:10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2026.099

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 生态产品价值实现是推动黄河流域生态保护与高质量发展的重要路径,如何在多层级治理结构和信息不对称条件下设计有效激励机制,提升真实生态投入并改善生态补偿效率,是当前亟待解决的重要问题。本文基于黄河流域生态治理现实,构建中央政府-地方政府-生态供给主体三阶段博弈模型,设置完全信息下社会最优基准、信息不对称下常规绩效补偿以及引入审计问责3种情形,系统考察生态补偿、地方监管与审计约束对生态产品供给及价值实现效率的影响。研究结果表明:(1)生态补偿强度提高能够促进生态供给主体增加真实生态投入,并扩大认证绩效与生态产品供给规模,但在信息不对称条件下也会同步强化认证偏差激励,导致供给规模扩张与供给真实性不足并存。(2)地方政府治理监管是连接财政激励与真实生态改善的关键传导机制,治理监管强化不仅能够压缩认证偏差、改善绩效识别,还能提高真实生态投入回报,从而提升生态产品供给效率。(3)相较于常规绩效补偿,审计问责机制在成本可控条件下能够强化地方监管、提高真实生态投入、压缩认证偏差并缩小绩效偏离,使制度结果向社会最优配置靠近,进而缓解信息不对称下的补偿错配问题。(4)随着生态产品基础收益提高,社会福利整体上升,而最优绩效性生态转移支付逐步下降并趋近于零,表明生态产品收益能力增强有助于降低制度对财政补偿的依赖,但制度优化仍不可替代。本文的研究结论有助于深化对生态产品价值实现机制的理论认识,并为优化黄河流域生态补偿制度、完善“生态补偿-地方监管-审计问责”协同治理体系提供政策参考。

关键词: 生态产品价值实现, 黄河流域, 生态补偿, 多层级治理, 审计问责

Abstract: Realizing the value of ecological products is an important pathway for promoting ecological protection and high-quality development in the Yellow River Basin. Under multi-level governance structures and conditions of information asymmetry, how to design effective incentive mechanisms to enhance genuine ecological investment and improve the efficiency of ecological compensation has become an urgent issue. Based on the realities of ecological governance in the Yellow River Basin, this paper constructs a three-stage game model involving the central government, local governments, and ecological suppliers. It considers three scenarios: the socially optimal benchmark under complete information, conventional performance-based compensation under information asymmetry, and the introduction of an audit accountability mechanism. The paper systematically examines the effects of ecological compensation, local supervision, and audit constraints on ecological product supply and the efficiency of value realization. The results show that:(1)Increasing the intensity of ecological compensation can encourage ecological suppliers to increase genuine ecological investment and expand certified performance as well as the scale of ecological product supply. However, under information asymmetry, it may also simultaneously strengthen incentives for certification bias, resulting in the coexistence of expanded supply scale and insufficient supply authenticity.(2)Local government supervision serves as a key transmission mechanism linking fiscal incentives with genuine ecological improvement. Strengthened supervision can not only reduce certification bias and improve performance identification, but also increase the returns to genuine ecological investment, thereby enhancing the efficiency of ecological product supply.(3)Compared with conventional performance-based compensation, the audit accountability mechanism, when costs are controllable, can strengthen local supervision, increase genuine ecological investment, reduce certification bias, and narrow performance deviations, thereby moving institutional outcomes closer to the socially optimal allocation and alleviating compensation mismatch under information asymmetry.(4)As the basic returns of ecological products increase, social welfare rises overall, while the optimal performance-based ecological transfer payment gradually declines and approaches zero. This indicates that the enhanced revenue-generating capacity of ecological products helps reduce institutional dependence on fiscal compensation, although institutional optimization remains indispensable. The findings of this paper contribute to a deeper theoretical understanding of the value realization mechanism of ecological products and provide policy implications for optimizing the ecological compensation system in the Yellow River Basin and improving a coordinated governance framework that integrates ecological compensation, local supervision, and audit accountability.

Key words: value realization of ecological products, Yellow River Basin, ecological compensation, multi-level governance, audit accountability

中图分类号:

F062.2

方兰,王阳阳. 多层级治理下生态产品价值实现的激励机制研究——基于黄河流域的三阶段博弈分析[J]. 《山东大学学报(理学版)》, 2026, 61(10): 8-28.

FANG Lan, WANG Yangyang. Incentive mechanisms for ecological product value realization under multilevel governance: a three-stage game analysis of the Yellow River Basin[J]. JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE), 2026, 61(10): 8-28.

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China Population, Resources and Environment, 2025, 35(12): 207-219. 附录 1 引理 1信息不对称下常规绩效补偿情形的均衡结果在信息不对称下的常规绩效补偿情形中,给定中央政府单位绩效性生态补偿强度,生态供给主体选择真实生态投入、综合认证偏差、地方政府选择治理监管水平以及各主体的均衡决策如下: eAI*=(a+βrAI*+λs)/(c_e); dAI*=(λs(1-ρrAI*))/φ; rAI*=((β[μ+(1-λ)s] )/(c_e)-(2λ(1-λ)ρs²)/φ)/(c_r-(2λ(1-λ)ρ²s²)/φ); πAI*_S=(a+βrAI*)eAI*+λsxAI*-(c_e)/2(eAI*)²-φ/2(dAI*)²; UAI*_L=μeAI*+(1-λ)sxAI*-(c_r)/2(rAI*)²; UAI*_C=νeAI*-sxAI*-k/2(sAI*)²。由于eAI*、dAI*、rAI*均随s变化,因此中央政府最优绩效性生态补偿强度sAI*由下式隐式确定: (dUAI*_C(s))/(ds)=0。该条件一般表现为关于s的高次非线性方程,难以得到简洁的显式解析解,故本文保留sAI*的隐式最优条件。现实中,绩效性生态补偿强度受到财政预算、补偿标准和政策边界约束,不可能无限提高,因此可设其经济可行区间为s∈[0,(-overs)] ,在该区间内,只要满足内点解条件和0≤ρrAI*≤1,中央政府目标函数 UAI*_C(s)为连续函数,因此最优绩效性生态补偿强度必然存在。进一步看,s对中央政府目标函数的影响具有“边际收益递减-边际成本递增”的特征。一方面,提高s能够通过地方传导机制提高生态供给主体的真实生态投入,从而增加中央政府从真实生态改善中获得的治理收益;但随着s上升,真实生态投入受到投入成本递增和地方治理监管成本约束,其边际增加幅度逐渐下降。另一方面,提高s也会扩大中央政府依据认证绩效支付的补偿支出,并强化认证偏差进入补偿口径的可能性,同时还会增加财政成本项k/2s²。因此,当s较低时,提高补偿强度所带来的真实生态改善收益通常大于其财政成本和绩效偏差成本;而当s较高时,边际补偿支出、财政成本以及认证偏差引致的支付扭曲逐渐占优,中央政府继续提高s的边际净收益随之下降。若记中央政府提高绩效性生态补偿强度的边际净收益为 M^AI(s)=(dπAI*_C(s))/(ds), 则在经济可行区间内,M^AI(s)随s增加由正转负,中央政府目标函数πAI*_C(s)呈现先上升后下降的单峰特征。此时,一阶条件M^AI(s)=0对应唯一的最优绩效性生态补偿强度sAI*。在后续数值模拟中,本文采用细网格搜索对UAI*_C(s)的单峰性进行检验,基准参数和稳健性参数扰动下均未发现多个局部最优。因此,本文将sAI*表示为由一阶条件确定的隐式唯一最优解,并在数值模拟部分对其进行显式刻画。附录 2 引理 2信息不对称下审计问责机制情形的均衡结果在信息不对称下的审计问责机制情形中,给定中央政府单位绩效性生态补偿强度s和审计问责强度q,生态供给主体选择真实生态投入e,综合认证偏差d,地方政府选择治理监管水平r。与常规绩效补偿情形相比,审计问责一方面提高生态供给主体实施认证偏差的成本,另一方面强化地方政府因认证偏差承担的责任成本。该情形下各主体的均衡决策如下: eAU*=(a+βrAU*+λs)/(c_e); dAU*=(λs(1-ρrAU*))/(φ+θq); rAU*=((β[μ+(1-λ)s] )/(c_e)-(2λ(1-λ)ρs²)/(φ+θq)+(χqλ²ρs²)/((φ+θq)²))/(c_r-(2λ(1-λ)ρ²s²)/(φ+θq)+(χqλ²ρ²s²)/((φ+θq)²)); πAU*_S=(a+βrAU*)eAU*+λsxAU*-(c_e)/2(eAU*)²-(φ+θq)/2(dAU*)²; UAU*_L=μeAU*+(1-λ)sxAU*-(c_r)/2(rAU*)²-(χq)/2(dAU*)²; UAU*_C=νeAU*-sxAU*-k/2s²-(c_A)/2q²。与引理1类似,由于eAU*、dAU*和rAU*均随绩效性生态补偿强度s变化,因此中央政府最优绩效性生态补偿强度sAU*由以下一阶条件隐式确定: (dUAU*_C(s))/(ds)=0。该条件一般表现为关于s的高次非线性方程,难以得到简洁的显式解析解,故本文保留sAU*的隐式最优条件。与引理1类似,保留隐式条件并不意味着最优解缺乏确定性。现实中,绩效性生态补偿强度受到财政预算、补偿标准和政策边界约束,不可能无限提高,因此可设其经济可行区间为s∈[0,(-overs)] ,在该区间内,只要满足内点解条件和0≤ρrAU*≤1,中央政府目标函数U AU*_C(s)为连续函数,因此最优绩效性生态补偿强度必然存在。进一步看,s对中央政府目标函数的影响仍具有“边际收益递减-边际成本递增”的特征。一方面,提高s能够通过地方传导机制提高生态供给主体的真实生态投入,从而增加中央政府从真实生态改善中获得的治理收益;另一方面,审计问责机制提高了认证偏差的制度成本,并强化了地方政府的责任约束,使补偿激励更容易转化为真实生态投入。但是,随着s继续上升,真实生态投入仍会受到投入成本递增和地方治理监管成本约束,其边际增加幅度逐渐下降。同时,中央政府依据认证绩效支付的补偿支出、财政成本以及认证偏差引致的支付扭曲也会随之增加。记审计问责情形下中央政府提高绩效性生态补偿强度的边际净收益:M^AU(s)=(dU AU*_C(s))/(ds),则在经济可行区间内,M^AU(s)随s增加由正转负,中央政府目标函数UAU*_C(s)呈现先上升后下降的单峰特征。此时,一阶条件M^AU(s)=0对应唯一的最优绩效性生态补偿强度sAU*。在后续数值模拟中,本文采用细网格搜索对UAU*_C(s)的单峰性进行检验,基准参数和稳健性参数扰动下均未发现多个局部最优。因此,本文将sAU*表示为由一阶条件确定的隐式唯一最优解,并在数值模拟部分对其进行显式刻画。附录 3 命题 2常规绩效补偿情形下生态供给主体行为响应与绩效偏离命题2考察在信息不对称下的常规绩效补偿情形中,绩效性生态补偿强度和地方治理监管水平对生态供给主体真实生态投入、综合认证偏差以及认证绩效偏离的影响。 (1)(əe^AI)/(əs)=λ/(c_e)>0;(əd^AI)/(əs)=(λ(1-ρr))/φ>0;(əe^AI)/(ər)=β/(c_e)>0;(əd^AI)/(ər)=-(λsρ)/φ<0。 (2)x^AI-e^AI=(λs(1-ρr^AI)²)/φ>0。附录 4 命题 3审计问责机制下生态供给主体行为响应与偏差约束命题3考察在引入审计问责机制后,绩效性生态补偿强度和地方治理监管水平对真实生态投入、综合认证偏差、认证绩效偏离及二者交互作用的影响。 (1)(əe^AU)/(əs)=λ/(c_e)>0,(əd^AU)/(əs)=(λ(1-ρr))/(φ+θq)>0,(əe^AU)/(ər)=β/(c_e)>0,(əd^AU)/(ər)=-(λsρ)/(φ+θq)<0; (2)x^AU-e^AU=(λs(1-ρr^AU)²)/(φ+θq)>0; (3)(ə²d^AU)/(əsər)=-(λρ)/(φ+θq)<0。附录 5 命题4—7证明为简化证明,先统一记号: B=(β[μ+(1-λ)s] )/(c_e),K₂=(2λ(1-λ)ρs²)/φ,K₃=(2λ(1-λ)ρs²)/(φ+θq)-(χqλ²ρs²)/((φ+θq)²), 则 r^AI=(B-K₂)/(c_r-ρK₂),r^AU=(B-K₃)/(c_r-ρK₃),e^AI=(a+βr⁽²⁾+λs)/(c_e), e^AU=(a+βr^AU+λs)/(c_e),d^AI=(λs(1-ρr^AI))/φ,d^AU=(λs(1-ρr^AU))/(φ+θq)。记绩效偏离程度为Δ=x-e, 则 Δ^AI=(λs(1-ρr^AI)²)/φ,Δ^AU=(λs(1-ρr^AU)²)/(φ+θq)。同时,为保证认证偏差及绩效偏离具有明确经济含义,以下均假设相应内点解条件成立,即 1-ρr^AI>0,1-ρr^AU>0。以下证明一个后续将反复使用的辅助结论: 由于φ+θq>φ,因此 (2λ(1-λ)ρs²)/(φ+θq)<(2λ(1-λ)ρs²)/φ, 又因为 (χqλ²ρs²)/((φ+θq)²)>0, 所以K₃2。定义 r(K)=(B-K)/(c_r-ρK), 对K求导得 (dr(K))/(dK)=(ρB-c_r)/((c_r-ρK)²), 因此,当c_r>ρB时,r(K)关于K单调递减。结合K₃2,可得 r^AU=r(K₃)>r(K₂)=r^AI。这一结果将用于命题4—7的证明。命题 4不同制度情形下真实生态投入水平的比较 e^AU-e^AI=(β(r^AU-r^AI))/(c_e), 结合辅助结果可知当c_r>ρB时,e^AU>e^AI。进一步比较第一最佳与审计问责情形: eFI-e^AU=(μ+ν-λs+β(rFI-r^AU))/(c_e), 若进一步满足μ+ν>λs,则eFI>e^AU。结合前述可得eFI>e^AU>e^AI。命题4得证。命题 5不同制度情形下地方治理监管水平的比较证明 rFI>r^AU。根据 r^AU=(B-K₃)/(c_r-ρK₃), 有 r^AU-B/(c_r)=(c_r(B-K₃)-B(c_r-ρK₃))/(c_r(c_r-ρK₃))=(K₃(ρB-c_r))/(c_r(c_r-ρK₃)), 当c_r>ρB, K₃>0时,有r^AUr),另 rFI=(β(a+μ+ν))/(c_ec_r-β²),B/(c_r)=(β[μ+(1-λ)s] )/(c_ec_r), 因此 rFI-B/(c_r)=(β{c_ec_r[a+ν-(1-λ)s] +β²[μ+(1-λ)s] })/(c_ec_r(c_ec_r-β²))。若进一步满足a+ν>(1-λ)s,则上式为正,从而r FI>B/(c_r)。结合r^AU>B/(c_r), rFI>r^AU;再结合r^AI^AU,最终得到rFI>r^AU>r^AI。命题5得证。命题 6认证偏差的比较由d^AI、d^AU以及辅助结果可知,1-ρr^AU<1-ρr^AI。进而 d^AU=(λs(1-ρr^AU))/(φ+θq)<(λs(1-ρr^AI))/(φ+θq)<(λs(1-ρr^AI))/φ=d^AI, 因此 dFI=0^AUAI, 命题6得证。命题 7绩效偏离比较由Δ^AI、Δ^AU的定义和辅助结果可知,(1-ρr^AU)²<(1-ρr^AI)², 进而 Δ^AU=(λs(1-ρr^AU)²)/(φ+θq)<(λs(1-ρr^AI)²)/(φ+θq)<(λs(1-ρr^AI)²)/φ=Δ^AI, 故ΔFI=0<Δ^AU<Δ^AI。命题7得证。附录 6 表1参数现实依据与校准方式 Table 1Parameter reality basis and calibration method参数基准值或区间参数性质现实依据与校准规则α[0.2,2.5] 生态产品基础边际收益不同地区、不同类型生态产品的市场化收益能力差异较大,因此设置较宽区间而非单一点值,用以刻画生态产品内生收益能力的地区与类型差异β0.4地方治理监管对真实投入回报的促进系数地方政府通过项目组织、技术服务、生态认证和品牌建设等方式提高真实生态投入回报,基准值设为中等促进程度μ0.8地方政府获得的单位生态改善效用地方政府能够从环境质量改善、区域绿色发展、社会稳定和绩效考核中获得治理收益,但部分生态收益具有流域外溢性,故其取值低于流域整体公共生态收益ν3中央政府获得的单位流域公共生态效益黄河上游和重点生态功能区提供的水源涵养、水土保持与生态屏障服务具有明显跨区域外溢性,据此设定ν>α、ν>μ,以刻画“上游保护、流域受益”的收益结构c_e2真实生态投入成本系数生态修复、绿色生产和持续维护具有边际成本递增特征,采用凸成本设定,并使基准情形下真实投入保持非负和内点c_r1.5地方治理监管成本系数地方监管需要财政投入、专业人员、信息核验和组织协调资源,设为中等偏高水平,并在1.2—1.8范围内进行稳健性检验φ1.2认证偏差私人成本系数认证偏差涉及申报包装、信息协调、信誉损失及被识别后的制度风险,采用边际成本递增的凸性成本,并通过内点条件约束其基准值ρ0.4地方监管压缩认证偏差的有效性系数地方监管能够识别和剔除部分认证偏差,但受治理能力和信息条件限制,通常难以完全消除偏差,故设为中等水平,并在0.3—0.5范围内检验λ0.5绩效性补偿传导比例现实中地方政府既需向生态供给主体传导激励,也需保留部分资金用于项目组织和政策执行,故设为中等传导情景,并在0.4—0.6范围内检验k0.6绩效性补偿财政成本系数补偿强度提高会增加预算筹措、资金管理和政策执行的边际成本,采用凸性财政成本设定,并结合最优补偿存在性条件进行校准表1(续)参数基准值或区间参数性质现实依据与校准规则q1审计问责强度将基准审计问责制度情景标准化为q=1,其余问责参数均相对于该基准表示,并在0.8—1.2范围内设置中低和中高审计情景θ0.8审计对生态供给主体偏差成本的强化系数自然资源资产审计、绩效核查与责任追究会提高偏差行为被识别和惩戒的预期代价,基准值设为中等偏强约束χ0.5地方政府偏差责任成本系数地方政府可能因监管不足、核查失真和放任认证偏差承担行政责任、绩效考核损失与声誉成本,故设置正向责任成本c_A0.5审计问责成本系数专项审计、现场核查、信息比对和责任追踪需要消耗行政与信息资源,设为中等成本,并在0.3—0.7范围内进行稳健性检验注:各参数均为无量纲化后的标准化数值。现实政策与统计资料主要用于约束参数的经济含义、相对关系和合理区间。附录 7 表 2关键参数扰动下社会福利与最优绩效性生态补偿强度的稳健性检验 Table 2Robustness test of social welfare and optimal performance ecological compensation intensity under the disturbance of key parameters扰动参数参数取值W FIW^AIW^AUs^AI*s^AU*福利排序ρ0.36.084 52.370 32.146 10.135 00.163 8W FI>W^AI>W^AUρ0.46.084 52.368 92.145 90.133 80.163 8W FI>W^AI>W^AUρ0.56.084 52.368 62.145 60.133 80.163 8W FI>W^AI>W^AUλ0.46.084 52.301 62.062 20.072 50.086 3W FI>W^AI>W^AUλ0.56.084 52.368 92.145 90.133 80.163 8W FI>W^AI>W^AUλ0.66.084 52.440 02.234 70.182 50.226 3W FI>W^AI>W^AUc_r1.26.171 42.395 22.172 60.135 00.165 0W FI>W^AI>W^AUc_r1.56.084 52.368 92.145 90.133 80.163 8W FI>W^AI>W^AUc_r1.86.027 92.352 12.127 70.133 80.162 5W FI>W^AI>W^AUq0.86.084 52.368 92.231 40.133 80.158 8W FI>W^AI>W^AUq1.06.084 52.368 92.145 90.133 80.163 8W FI>W^AI>W^AUq1.26.084 52.368 92.039 20.133 80.167 5W FI>W^AI>W^AUc_A0.36.084 52.368 92.245 90.133 80.163 8W FI>W^AI>W^AUc_A0.56.084 52.368 92.145 90.133 80.163 8W FI>W^AI>W^AUc_A0.76.084 52.368 92.045 90.133 80.163 8W FI>W^AI>W^AU注:稳健性检验固定生态产品基础收益参数a=1,采用单参数扰动方法,即每次仅改变一个关键参数,其余参数保持基准值不变。

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