动力电池闭环供应链中利他行为与政府补贴政策的影响

doi:10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2025.128

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了分析利他偏好行为和政府补贴政策对动力电池闭环供应链的影响,通过构建由电池制造商、零售商、第三方回收商组成的动力电池闭环供应链,在电池制造商对第三方回收商具有利他偏好行为的背景下,运用博弈论分别建立了无补贴政策、对电池制造商生态设计补贴、对第三方回收商回收成本补贴三种决策模型。研究结果表明:(1)电池制造商的利他偏好行为可以提高回收率和社会福利,促进供应链系统的稳定,但会以损失自身利润为代价;(2)政府对第三方回收商实行回收成本补贴政策时,废旧动力电池的回收率最高。然而,当电池制造商具有较强的利他偏好时,回收成本补贴政策会对社会福利产生不利的影响;(3)在政府对电池制造商进行生态设计补贴的情形下,社会福利显著高于另外两种情形,但是此时的废旧动力电池的回收率最低。

Abstract: In order to analyze the impact of altruistic preference(AP)and government subsidy on the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)of power batteries, this paper constructs a CLSC of power batteries composed of the battery manufacturer, retailer, and third-party recycler. In the context of the battery manufacturer exhibiting AP towards the third-party recycler, this paper utilizes game theory to establish three decision models: without subsidy policy, subsidy for battery manufacturer in eco-design, and subsidy for third-party recyclers in recycling cost. The research results show that:(1)AP of the battery manufacturer can increase the recycling rate and social welfare, and maintain the stability of the supply chain system, but at the cost of the manufacturers profits;(2)When the government implements a subsidy policy for the recycling cost of the third-party recycler, the recycling rate of used power batteries is the highest. However, when the battery manufacturer exhibits strong AP, the recycling cost subsidy policy may have adverse effects on social welfare;(3)In the model of the government providing subsidy for the battery manufacturer in eco-design, social welfare is significantly higher than in the other two models, but the recycling rate of used power batteries is the lowest.

Key words: power battery, closed-loop supply chain, altruistic preference, eco-design subsidy, recycling cost subsidy

肖敏,高大顺,何新华,谢富纪. 动力电池闭环供应链中利他行为与政府补贴政策的影响[J]. 《山东大学学报(理学版)》, 2026, 61(8): 52-63.

XIAO Min, GAO Dashun, HE Xinhua, XIE Fuji. Altruistic preference and government subsidy policies on the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries[J]. JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE), 2026, 61(8): 52-63.

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