考虑零售商企业社会责任的低碳供应链政府补贴策略

doi:10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2022.412

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

考虑零售商具有企业社会责任(corporate social responsibility, CSR), 建立由政府、制造商与零售商组成的三方博弈模型, 对比分析了在无政府补贴、研发补贴、产量补贴以及研发补贴与产量补贴相结合的双重补贴策略4种情形下的社会福利、碳减排率、低碳产品需求及环境改善的情况, 研究了政府最优补贴策略问题。结果表明: 消费者低碳偏好及研发效率的提高会促进环境改善并提高产品减排率、低碳产品需求、企业收益及社会福利水平。随着零售商CSR水平提升, 政府会减少补贴力度, 然而社会总福利、产品减排率及低碳产品需求并不会降低。4种补贴策略均有利于提高碳减排率、低碳产品需求和社会福利水平并促进环境改善, 从而更好地达成经济、社会与环境目标。制造商更偏好于双重补贴策略, 而零售商在自身CSR水平较高时偏好于研发补贴政策, 否则, 更偏好于双重补贴策略。

关键词: 企业社会责任, 低碳供应链, 碳补贴, 博弈模型

Abstract:

Considering that retailers have corporate social responsibility(CSR), a tripartite game model consisting of government, manufacturers, and retailers was established to compare and analyze the social welfare, carbon emission reduction rate, demand for low-carbon products, and environmental improvement under four different subsidy strategies: no government subsidy, R&D subsidy, production subsidy, and a dual subsidy which composed of R&D subsidy and production subsidy, the optimal subsidy strategy of the government was studied. The results indicate that the improvement of consumer low-carbon preferences and research and development efficiency will promote environmental improvement and increase product emission reduction rates, demand for low-carbon products, corporate profits, and social welfare levels. As the CSR level of retailers increases, the government will reduce subsidies, but the overall social welfare, product emission reduction rate and demand for low-carbon products will not decrease. All four subsidy strategies are conducive to increasing carbon emission reduction rates, demand for low-carbon products, social welfare levels, and promoting environmental improvement, thereby better achieving economic, social, and environmental goals. Manufacturers prefer the government's dual subsidy strategy, while retailers prefer the R&D subsidy policy when their CSR level is high, otherwise, they prefer the dual subsidy strategy.

Key words: corporate social responsibility, low carbon supply chain, carbon subsidy, game model

中图分类号:

F274

李凤,程春龙,郭烨锋. 考虑零售商企业社会责任的低碳供应链政府补贴策略[J]. 《山东大学学报(理学版)》, 2024, 59(1): 85-99.

Feng LI,Chun-long CHENG,Ye-feng GUO. Government subsidy strategy of low carbon supply chain considering retailer's corporate social responsibility[J]. JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE), 2024, 59(1): 85-99.

图/表 19

表1

图1

表2

不同情形博弈结果对比分析"

变量	无政府补贴(N)	技术补贴(T)	产量补贴(Q)	双重补贴(D)
π^{j^*}_g	$k A 2 [(2 - β) β + k (7 - 4 γ)] 2 [2 k (2 - γ) - β 2] 2$	$A 2 [1 + (7 - 4 γ) k] 8 k (γ - 2) 2 - 2 β B$	$k A 2 2 [k - β (2 + β)]$	$k A 2 2 [k - (1 + β) 2]$
π^{j^*}_m	$k A 2 2 [2 k (2 - γ) - β 2]$	$A 2 [2 k (2 - γ) - β] 8 k (2 - γ) 2 - 2 β B$	$k A 2 [2 k (2 - γ) - β 2] 2 [k - β (2 + β)] 2$	$k A 2 [2 k (2 - γ) - β (1 + β)] 2 [k - (1 + β) 2] 2$
π^{j^*}_r	$k 2 A 2 (1 - γ) [2 k (2 - γ) - β 2] 2$	$A 2 [2 k (2 - γ) - β] 2 (1 - γ) [4 k (2 - γ) 2 - β B] 2$	$k 2 A 2 (1 - γ) 2 [k - β (2 + β)] 2$	$k 2 A 2 (1 - γ) [k - (1 + β) 2] 2$
r^{j^*}	$A β 2 k (2 - γ) - β 2$	$(7 β - 4 β γ + 4 - 2 γ) A 4 (2 - γ) 2 k - β B$	$A β k - β (2 + β)$	$A (1 + β) k - (1 + β) 2$
q^{j^*}	$k A 2 k (2 - γ) - β 2$	$A [2 (2 - γ) k - β] 4 (2 - γ) 2 k - β B$	$k A k - β (2 + β)$	$k A k - (1 + β) 2$
EI^{j^*}	$k 2 A 2 β [2 k (2 - γ) - β 2] 2$	$A 2 [2 k (2 - γ) - β] (B - 4 + 2 γ) [4 (2 - γ) 2 k - β B] 2$	$k A 2 β [k - β (2 + β)] 2$	$k A 2 (1 + β) [k - (1 + β) 2] 2$

表2

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符号	含义	符号	含义
θ	低碳技术研发投入补贴系数, 0≤θ＜1	a	产品的市场容量, a>c
μ	低碳产品单位补贴数额	k	研发投入成本系数, 1/k为研发效率, k>0
r	制造商的单位产品碳减排率, 0≤r＜1	γ	CSR实施水平, 0≤γ≤1
w	制造商的批发价格	GS	政府补贴支出
c	制造商的单位产品成本, c>0	π_i^j	各决策者的收益, i=g, m, r, j=N, T, Q, D
p	零售商的零售价格	V^j	零售商的效用, j=N, T, Q, D
β	消费者低碳偏好程度	SW^j	社会总福利, j=N, T, Q, D
q	产品的市场需求

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