考虑零售商横向公平的二层供应链网络均衡决策

doi:10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2018.033

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 将单个制造商和零售商的供应链纵向公平研究拓展到上层为单个制造商、下层为多个零售商和需求市场的二层供应链网络,分析多个零售商间的横向公平偏好行为。由于下层零售商具有竞争关系,零售商在决策时会因为与同层其他零售商的利润比较而产生横向公平偏好行为。在考虑多个零售商间横向公平偏好基础上,构建了多个零售商的Nash博弈模型及二层供应链上下层间的Stackelberg-Nash博弈模型,并利用罚函数法求解得到供应链各成员的均衡决策。重点分析多个零售商间的横向公平偏好行为对供应链各成员均衡决策、利润和效用的影响。数值结果表明:供应链成员均衡决策都受到零售商横向公平偏好行为影响,且制造商最优利润、零售商最优效用都低于零售商公平中性时的结果。最后对供应链成员应对横向公平偏好提出合理建议。

关键词: 均衡决策, 横向公平, 罚函数法

Abstract: We extended the vertical fairness research on a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer, and considered the horizontal fairness preference in a two-layer supply chain network consisted by an upper tier for a single manufacturer and a lower tier for multiple retailers and demand markets. The retailer chooses his decision based on the horizontal fairness preference comparing the profit of other retailers. Considering retailers horizontal fairness preference, the Nash game model of the retailers and the Stackelberg-Nash game model of the two-layer supply chain network were constructed. The optimal decisions of a two-layer supply chain network were obtained by the penalty function algorithm. The numerical results show that the horizontal fairness preference among retailers lead to different changes in the decisions of the supply chain members, and the maximum profit of manufacturer and the maximum utility of retailers are lower than those of neutral retailers. Finally, some advices are provided to the supply chain members to deal with the horizontal fairness preference.

Key words: horizontal fairness, equilibrium decision, penalty function algorithm

中图分类号:

F274

郑英杰,周岩. 考虑零售商横向公平的二层供应链网络均衡决策[J]. 山东大学学报（理学版）, 2018, 53(9): 69-82.

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