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山东大学学报（理学版） ›› 2018, Vol. 53 ›› Issue (9): 83-94.doi: 10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2018.032

• • 上一篇    

竞争型零售商具公平敏感性的供应链决策

张克勇1*,李江鑫1,姚建明2,李春霞1   

  1. 1. 中北大学经济与管理学院, 山西 太原 030051;2. 中国人民大学商学院, 北京 100872
  • 收稿日期:2018-01-23 出版日期:2018-09-20 发布日期:2018-09-10
  • 作者简介:张克勇(1972— ),男,博士,教授,研究方向为供应链管理、物流选址与优化. E-mail:zhangkeyong@163.com*通信作者简介:李江鑫(1990— ),女,硕士研究生,研究方向为供应链管理. E-mail:yl160829@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472183)

Research on supply chain decision making of equitable retailers with fair sensitivities

ZHANG Ke-yong1*, LI Jiang-xin1, YAO Jian-ming2, LI Chun-xia1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, North University of China, Taiyuan 030051, Shanxi, China;
    2. School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
  • Received:2018-01-23 Online:2018-09-20 Published:2018-09-10

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摘要： 为了研究公平偏好主体的异质性对供应链决策的影响,将公平敏感性引入公平偏好决策者的决策模型,构建由1个制造商、2个竞争零售商,并且其中1个零售商兼具公平偏好和公平敏感性的二级供应链。基于社会比较理论,分别建立该零售商具横向公平偏好和纵向公平偏好的供应链决策模型,得到不同公平状态下公平敏感性系数对决策者决策变量及效用的影响。最后通过数值算例对结论进行验证。研究结果表明:公平偏好及公平敏感性的存在并不能增加零售商本身的效用值,且在横向公平偏好下,加剧了2个零售商之间的竞争。在不利不公平情形下,该零售商的效用随着公平敏感性系数的增加而增加,而在有利不公平情形下随着公平敏感系数的增加而减少。因此,在不利不公平情形下,该零售商应当保持谦逊自卑,不要高估自己的能力、地位;而在有利不公平情形下要保持自信,只有这样才能保证自身效用的最大化。

关键词: 横向公平, Bertrand模型, 供应链, 纵向公平, 公平敏感性, Stackelberg模型

Abstract: In order to study the influence of heterogeneity of subject of fair preference on the decision of supply chain, fair sensitivity was introduced to the decision model of fair preference decision-maker. We build a secondary supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, two competing retailers, one of which has a fair preference and fair sensitivity. Based on the social comparison theory, a supply chain decision model with horizontal equity preference and vertical equity preference was established, and the influence of fair sensitivity coefficient on decision variables and utility of decision makers was obtained. Finally, numerical examples were used to verify the conclusion. The results show that the existence of fair preference and fair sensitivity does not increase the utility value of retailer itself, and it increases the competition between the two retailers under the horizontal equity preference. In the adverse unfair situation, the utility of the retailer increases with the increase of the fair sensitivity coefficient, and decreases with the increase of the fair sensitivity coefficient in the favorable unfair situation. Therefore, in the case of unfair adverse circumstances, the retailer should remain humble inferiority, and should not overestimate his own abilities and status. But in the case of favorable unfair circumstances, the retailer should be confident. Only in this way can he keep the utility maximization.

Key words: horizontal equity, vertical equity, Bertrand model, supply chain, fairness sensitivity, Stackelberg model

中图分类号: 

  • F224
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