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《山东大学学报(理学版)》 ›› 2019, Vol. 54 ›› Issue (11): 20-34.doi: 10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2018.666

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考虑零售商社会比较行为的双渠道供应链均衡策略

吴正祥,李宝库   

  1. 辽宁工程技术大学营销管理学院, 辽宁 葫芦岛 125105
  • 发布日期:2019-11-06
  • 作者简介:吴正祥(1989— ),男,博士,讲师,研究方向为营销科学、供应链管理、行为运作管理. E-mail:wuzhengxiang89@126.com

Equilibrium strategies of dual-channel supply chain considering the retailers social comparison behavior

WU Zheng-xiang, LI Bao-ku   

  1. School of Marketing Management, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105, Liaoning, China
  • Published:2019-11-06

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摘要： 研究零售商具有社会比较行为的“一对一”型双渠道供应链均衡策略问题。依据零售商与制造商间的横向竞争关系和纵向买卖关系,将零售商的社会比较行为分为横向和纵向社会比较行为。探讨了零售商具有横向竞争偏好时双渠道供应链的均衡策略,证明了零售商的落后厌恶偏好和领先寻求偏好均会降低其与制造商的议价能力;制造商可以利用批发价格制定权控制渠道间的价格竞争。分析了零售商同时具有横向竞争偏好和纵向公平偏好时双渠道供应链的均衡策略,证明了在制造商主导情形下,零售商的不利不公平厌恶偏好不影响零售商的落后厌恶偏好对双渠道供应链均衡策略的作用方向;在零售商主导情形下,零售商较高的有利不公平厌恶偏好会改变零售商的领先寻求偏好对双渠道供应链均衡策略的作用方向。

关键词: 社会比较, 公平偏好, 竞争偏好, 不公平厌恶, 落后厌恶, 领先寻求

Abstract: Equilibrium strategies of one-to-one dual-channel supply chain that the retailer with social comparison behavior is investigated. According to the relationship of horizontal competition and vertical trading between the seller and the manufacturer, the retailers social comparison behavior is divided into horizontal and vertical social comparison behavior. The equilibrium strategies of dual-channel supply chain that the retailer with horizontal competitive preference were discussed, and the results show that both the preference of behind aversion and ahead seeking of the retailer can reduce his bargaining power with manufacturer; and the manufacturer can control the price competition between channels by using his pricing power. In addition, the equilibrium strategies of dual-channel supply chain that the retailer with both horizontal and vertical social comparison behavior were analyzed, and the findings indicate that in the manufacturer dominant market, the influence direction of retailers behind aversion preference on the equilibrium strategies of dual-channel supply chain is not affected by the retailers disadvantageous inequity aversion preference; however, under the retailer-dominated market, the influence direction of retailers ahead seeking preference on the equilibrium strategies of dual-channel supply will be changed by the higher advantageous inequity aversion preference of the retailer.

Key words: social comparison, fairness preference, competitive preference, inequity aversion, behind aversion, ahead seeking

中图分类号: 

  • F274
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