区块链时代下双边平台信息披露决策研究

doi:10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2021.616

《山东大学学报(理学版)》 ›› 2022, Vol. 57 ›› Issue (3): 89-95.doi: 10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2021.616

• • 上一篇

区块链时代下双边平台信息披露决策研究

桂云苗¹,胡红春^2*,龚本刚¹

1. 安徽工程大学经济与管理学院, 安徽芜湖 241000;2. 中国烟草总公司职工进修学院, 河南郑州 450008

发布日期:2022-03-15
作者简介:桂云苗(1978— ),男,博士研究生,教授,研究方向为平台运营管理. E-mail:ymgui@ahpu.edu.cn*通信作者简介:胡红春(1969— ),男,博士研究生,研究员,研究方向为运营管理. E-mail:759150070@qq.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071002);安徽省自然科学基金资助项目(2008085MG229)

Research on information disclosure decision of bilateral platform in the blockchain era

GUI Yun-miao¹, HU Hong-chun^2*, GONG Ben-gang¹

1. School of Economics and Management, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, Anhui, China;
2. Staff Development Institute of China National Tobacco Corporation, Zhengzhou 450008, Henan, China

Published:2022-03-15

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在考虑区块链对单位信息披露成本与平台用户需求函数的影响基础上,分别建立了垄断、竞争瓶颈和双寡头市场下平台信息披露的博弈决策模型,并进一步研究消费者信息认知程度对平台信息披露决策的影响。通过研究发现,垄断和竞争市场下,平台信息最优披露水平会随着信息敏感消费者比例增大而增大,随着单位信息披露成本降低而增加。竞争瓶颈和双寡头市场下平台信息最优披露水平均相同,平台最优利润会随着信息披露竞争程度加剧而降低时。当消费者对信息越敏感或消费者对信息认知水平越低时,平台采取区块链技术提高产品的信息披露水平会获取更多利润。

关键词: 区块链, 双边平台, 信息披露, 博弈模型

Abstract: Based on the influence of blockchain on unit information disclosure cost and platform users demand function, the game decision-making models of platform information disclosure under monopoly is established, competition bottleneck and duopoly market respectively, and further studies the influence of consumer information cognition on platform information disclosure decision-making. It is found that the optimal information disclosure level of platform will increase with the increase of the proportion of information sensitive consumers, and increase with the reduction of unit information disclosure cost in monopoly and competitive markets. The optimal information disclosure level of platform in competitive bottleneck and duopoly market is the same, and the optimal profit of platform will decrease with the increase of information disclosure competition. When consumers are more sensitive to information or consumers cognitive level of information is lower, platforms will gain more profits by adopting blockchain technology to improve the information disclosure level of products.

Key words: blockchain, two-sided platform, information disclosure, game model

中图分类号:

F272.3

桂云苗,胡红春,龚本刚. 区块链时代下双边平台信息披露决策研究[J]. 《山东大学学报(理学版)》, 2022, 57(3): 89-95.

GUI Yun-miao, HU Hong-chun, GONG Ben-gang. Research on information disclosure decision of bilateral platform in the blockchain era[J]. JOURNAL OF SHANDONG UNIVERSITY(NATURAL SCIENCE), 2022, 57(3): 89-95.

参考文献

[1] UMEHARA E, OHTA T. Using game theory to investigate risk information disclosure by government agencies and satisfying the public: the role of the guardian agent[J]. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics-Part A: Systems and Humans, 2009, 39(2):321-330.
[2] RAYO L, SEGAL I. Optimal information disclosure[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2010, 118(5):949-987.
[3] ZIMMER J C, ARSAL R E, AL-MARZOUQ M, et al. Investigating online information disclosure: effects of information relevance, trust and risk[J]. Information & Management, 2010, 47(2):115-123.
[4] HUANG S, YANG J. Information acquisition and transparency in a supply chain with asymmetric production cost information[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, 182:449-464.
[5] MARKOPOULOS P M, HOSANAGAR K. A model of product design and information disclosure investments[J]. Management Science, 2018, 64(2):739-759.
[6] HAGIU A, HAŁABURDA H. Information and two-sided platform profits[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2014, 34:25-35.
[7] 邹佳, 郭立宏. 基于不同用户信息水平的双边平台最优价格博弈时序研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2017, 31(3):117-125. ZOU Jia, GUO Lihong. Optimal timing of two-sided platforms pricing games under different levels of users information[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2017, 31(3):117-125.
[8] 曲创,刘重阳.平台竞争一定能提高信息匹配效率吗?——基于中国搜索引擎市场的分析[J].经济研究,2019,54(8):120-135. QU Chuang, LIU Chongyang. Does platform competition always improve the efficiency of information transmission?: a case study of Chinas search engine market[J]. Economics Research, 2019, 54(8):120-135.
[9] ARMSTRONG M. Competition in two-sided markets[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37(3):668-691.
[10] WANG S Y, CHEN H M, WU D S. Regulating platform competition in two-sided markets under the O2O era[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2019, 215:131-143.
[11] HAGIU A, WRIGHT J. Controlling vs. enabling[J]. Management Science, 2019, 65(2):577-595.
[12] TAN B, ANDERSON E G Jr, PARKER G G. Platform pricing and investment to drive third-party value creation in two-sided networks[J]. Information Systems Research, 2020, 31(1):217-239.
[13] AZZI R, CHAMOUN R K, SOKHN M. The power of a blockchain-based supply chain[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2019, 135:582-592.
[14] CHOI T M, GUO S, LIU N, et al. Optimal pricing in on-demand-service-platform-operations with hired agents and risk-sensitive customers in the blockchain era[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2020, 284(3):1031-1042.
[15] SCHMIDT C G, WAGNER S M. Blockchain and supply chain relations: a transaction cost theory perspective[J]. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 2019, 25(4):100552.
[16] CHOI T M, FENG L P, LI R. Information disclosure structure in supply chains with rental service platforms in the blockchain technology era[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2020, 221:107473.
[17] 渠慎宁. 区块链助推实体经济高质量发展:模式、载体与路径[J]. 改革, 2020(1):39-47. QU Shenning. Blockchain promoting high-quality development of entity economy: mode, carrier and path[J]. Reform, 2020(1):39-47.
[18] GABSZEWICZ J J, WAUTHY X Y. Vertical product differentiation and two-sided markets[J]. Economics Letters, 2014, 123(1):58-61.

多维度评价

Viewed

Full text

Abstract

Cited

Shared

Discussed

区块链时代下双边平台信息披露决策研究

Research on information disclosure decision of bilateral platform in the blockchain era

PDF (PC)

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 5

多维度评价

本文评价

推荐阅读 0

[1]	康海燕,邓婕. 区块链数据隐私保护研究综述[J]. 《山东大学学报(理学版)》, 2021, 56(5): 92-110.
[2]	宋宇波,张仕奇,宋睿. 一种基于投票权竞争的区块链共识机制[J]. 《山东大学学报(理学版)》, 2020, 55(3): 43-50.
[3]	曹慧荣,周伟,褚童,周洁. 政府征税与补贴Bertrand博弈模型的动力学分析[J]. 《山东大学学报(理学版)》, 2019, 54(11): 52-62.
[4]	张键红,白文乐,欧培荣. 基于区块链的匿名密码货币支付协议[J]. 《山东大学学报(理学版)》, 2019, 54(1): 88-95.
[5]	徐兵,张阳. 基于Hotelling模型的两厂商选址定价完全序贯决策[J]. 山东大学学报（理学版）, 2017, 52(6): 1-9.