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《山东大学学报(理学版)》 ›› 2019, Vol. 54 ›› Issue (7): 117-123.doi: 10.6040/j.issn.1671-9352.0.2018.451

• • 上一篇    

多边市场中平台策略分析

徐进1,张江华2   

  1. 1.山东大学数学学院, 山东 济南 250100;2.山东大学管理学院, 山东 济南 250100
  • 发布日期:2019-06-27
  • 作者简介:徐进(1981— ),男,博士,高级实验师,研究方向为博弈论及其应用. E-mail:stars21xu@aliyun.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571111,11631014)

Analysis of strategies in multi-sided markets

XU Jin1, ZHANG Jiang-hua2   

  1. 1. School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, Shandong, China;
    2. School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, Shandong, China
  • Published:2019-06-27

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摘要： 多边市场是经济中的重要现象,构建了一个包括平台、用户、广告商和内容商的多边市场模型。研究了社会福利最大化和利润最大化的平台定价,对比了平台在双边和多边市场下的利润,讨论了平台的最优服务水平。得到以下结论:(1)平台对于3类参与者的收费,与成本、参与者的外部性贡献以及自身的参与弹性有关;(2)平台是否选择有广告商的多边市场模式,取决于广告对于平台正负影响的关系,即比较广告带给平台的直接收益和广告减少所产生的用户数量的损失;(3)平台向用户提供的最优服务水平,与用户对内容商和广告商的外部性有关,且平台提供服务的成本会转移给其他参与者。

关键词: 多边市场, 福利分析, 定价, 最优服务, 策略

Abstract: Multi-sided markets is an important phenomenon in economy. A model of multi-sided markets including platform, users, advertisers and content providers is constructed. The platform pricing of social welfare maximization and profit maximization is studied, the profits of the platform in two-sided and multi-sided markets is compared, and the optimal service level of the platform is discussed. The following conclusions are drawn:(1)The fees of the platform for the 3 types of participants are related to the cost, the external contribution of participants and the flexibility of their participation;(2)Whether the platform chooses a multi-sided markets model with advertisers depends on the positive and negative impact of advertising on the platform, that is, to compare the direct benefits of advertising to the platform and the loss of the number of users caused by the reduction of advertising;(3)The optimal service level provided by the platform to users is related to the externality of users to content providers and advertisers, the cost of service provided by the platform will be transferred to other participants.

Key words: multi-sided markets, welfare analysis, pricing, optimal service, strategy

中图分类号: 

  • O225
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